股票/基金&
12月新政盘点:沪版保险“国十条”出炉 再生育申请规定实施
　　一眨眼，2014年已走到了最后一个月。回顾整个2014年，各项政策相继出台，涉及民生的面面，与上海市民生活息息相关。东方网上海频道的小编们也从下半年开始，相继推出每月新政盘点，为大家整理最新消息，成为市民关注的热点。　　12月份我们将继续这一优良传统，新政盘点又和大家“不见不散”啦!到底有哪些政策在十二月实施？对这些新政你又了解多少？请跟随东方网小编一起关注起来。　　上海范围　　沪版保险"国十条"出炉 2020年上海目标：保险密度:7300元/人　　备受关注的《上海市人民政府贯彻〈国务院关于加快发展现代保险服务业的若干意见〉的实施意见》（又被成为上海版保险“国十条”）获市政府批准通过，将于今年12月1日起实施。根据实施意见，到2020年要基本建成与上海经济社会发展相适应的现代保险服务体系，发展成为国际保险中心。包括个人税收递延型商业、住房反向抵押养老保险等与市民生活息息相关的保险试点也将加速推动。　　小编点评：　　根据上海版保险“国十条”的规划，到2020年，上海地区的保险深度（收入/国内生产总值）达到6%，保险密度（保费收入/总人口）达到7300元/人。而全国保险深度达到5%，保险密度达到3500元/人。对比来看，上海保险深度超过全国水准，保险密度更是超过全国标准的两倍。　　其中值得关注的是，个税递延型养老保险将试点，这也意味着人在税前买入养老，可以在领取保险金时再缴纳个人所得税，对投保人而言具备一定的税收优惠。　　上海“再生育申请规定”12月起实施 弄虚作假者将严处　　上海市卫生早前发布消息称，《上海市再生育子女申请办理规定》（以下简称《规定》）于12月1日起实施。　　根据《规定》，要求安排再生育一个子女的夫妻，到其中一方户籍地或者本市户籍人户分离人员办理了现居住地登记的乡、镇人民政府或者街道办事处提交再生育子女申请表，并按照本规定要求提供相应材料　　。（包括：身份证明、户籍证明、婚姻状况证明、已有子女状况的声明），夫妻中的独生子女一方应当提供证明本人是独生子女的有关材料。　　《规定》明确，区（县）卫生和计划生育行政管理部门自收到乡、镇人民政府或者街道办事处报送的受理意见和全部申请材料之日起十个工作日内审查完毕。对符合条件的，发给再生育子女告知书；对不符合条件的，应当书面通知申请人，并说明理由。　　此次《规定》中，增加了四种“独生子女”情况：　　1、本人14周岁前被收养，养父母无其他子女的；　　2、由社会福利机构抚养成人且没有兄弟姐妹的；　　3、夫妇只生育一个子女，该子女以及该夫妇依法收养的查找不到生父母和兄弟姐妹的弃婴或儿童；　　4、只生育一个子女的夫妇离异后，该子女经法院判决或协议由一方抚养并长期共同生活，且抚养方未再婚或再婚后未再生育的。　　新政进一步扩大了“独生子女”的范围，让再生育受益人群范围增广。除此之外，新政对弄虚作假者的处理也相应加强，更有法可依。　　上海电商管理新标12月1日将实行　　市质监局发布《电子商务服务平台入驻商户管理规范》地方标准，该标准将于今年12月1日起实施。本市将通过标准化的手段，对电子商务平台入驻商户全行业的准入和退出机制，来保证商品的质量，保护消费者权益。　　　　“双十一”之后即将迎来“双十二”……这些原本普通的日子，被电商们演变成一个个“剁手日”。“激情”后归淡，各种问题却不断浮现。　　越来越多的平台如、当当网、1号店等知名网站转向了开放平台、吸引商户入驻、收取管理费和等模式来盈利。在这种模式下，平台运营商无法通过实物商品的检验来保证平台上经营的商品质量，只能通过对入驻商户的经营资质、商品资质等审核来解决这一问题。　　此次电商管理新标的出台，无疑加强了对电子商务服务平台的管理和监督，将消费者切身利益放在了首位。同时，也为市场运作增添了标准，给市民百姓网上购物增加了保障。　　:　　上海电商管理新标12月1日实行　　新安全生产法12月1日施行 特别重大事故最高罚2000万　　新修订的《安全生产法》将从12月1日起施行。新法增加完善15项规定，创新建立10项法律制度，强化10项法律规定。　　新法把加强事前预防、强化隐患排查治理作为一项重要内容，建立预防安全生产事故制度；总结近年来的试点经验，通过引入保险机制，促进安全生产，鼓励生产经营单位投保安全生产责任保险；新法还加大了对安全生产违法行为的责任追究力度。　　　　新修订的《安全生产法》按照两个责任主体、四个事故等级，规定了对生产经营单位及其主要负责人的八项处罚，并大幅提高了对事故责任单位的罚款金额。　　一般事故罚款20万元至50万元，较大事故50万元至100万元，重大事故100万元至500万元，特别重大事故500万元至1000万元；特别重大事故、情节特别严重的，罚款1000万元至2000万元。　　安全生产一直是老生常谈的问题，可也最容易被企业和个人所轻视。以往，处罚成本低也是让用人单位对安全生产掉以轻心的一个方面。此次《安全生产法》修订后，提高了处罚力度，最高罚款可能达2000万，想必这样的“紧箍咒”，一定能让企业和个人不再“得过且过”了。　　　　新《安全生产法》实施三大亮点 念紧安全“紧箍咒”　　新安全生产法施行 特别重大事故最高罚2000万　　上海酒类产销管理行政处罚裁量规则12月施行　　为贯彻国务院关于加强法治政府建设、规范和监督行政执法部门依法合理行使行政处罚裁量权、提高依法行政水平，根据市政府《关于本市建立行政处罚裁量基准制度的指导意见》（沪府发〔2013〕32号）的要求，市商务委在执法实践较多、社会关注度较高的酒类流通领域，结合全市酒类执法实践，制定并发布了《上海市商务委员会关于行政处罚裁量基准的适用规则》（沪商公贸〔号）。　　酒类流通行政处罚裁量基准的制定以合法性、适当性、可操作性为原则，采用划分裁量阶次模式对《条例》规定的具有裁量权的行政处罚条文进行了细化和量化。裁量基准明确了酒类流通行政处罚裁量的基本原则，适用主体和范围，从重、从轻、减轻处罚的情形，规定了执法单位须建立完善集体讨论、说明理由、评议考核工作制度等内容，并对“无批发、零售许可证经验酒类商品”、“未依法变更注销”、“涂伪转卖许可证”、“批发零售假冒伪劣酒类商品”等7项违法行为，按照各自违法情节的不同，一一对应地分档次具体，列明了处罚裁量的基准。　　酒类流通行政处罚裁量基准作为市商务委行政规范性文件已于今年11月12日印发公布，并将于日起实施。　　　　“上海所有的大型餐饮企业几乎都被查出过假酒。”上海市酒类专卖管理局局长卢荣华早在2010年10月就这样告诉过全国政协提案委“尽快制定酒类管理法规”重点提案调研组。有着8年酒类管理工作经历的他深谙酒类的问题。　　12.15起，上海将实施酒类管理行政处罚裁量规则及基准表。规定8种从重及4种从轻减轻处罚情形；生产销售假冒伪劣酒类产品处违法所得1-5倍罚款，严重者或被吊销许可证。违法成本的进一步提高，势必能将违法行为扼杀在摇篮中。　　全国范围：　　12月起火车票预售期延至60天　　据中国铁路总公司：12月1日，预售期由20天延长至30天；12月2日至6日，预售期每天再比上一日延长6天；12月6日起，延长至60天；12月7日，提前60天开始发售2015年春运车票。车站窗口等其他售票方式仍按错后两天的原则执行。　　另外，11月28日起铁路部门调整互联网、电话订票起售时间。放票时间点从16个调整为21个，即8:00至18:00期间，每个整点和半点均有新票起售，同时C、D、G字头列车不再单独起售，起售时间与车站保持一致。　　　　虽然铁路部门声称，此次延长预售期是为了更方便旅客购票，把售票的和出行的高峰错开，不过此项“便民”之举却引起广大旅客一片吐槽声。有人大呼，：“春运票更难抢了！”　　将火车票预售期延长至60天，与民航购票方式“接轨”，但是火车票预售期暂时不能与机票预售相提并论。虽然高铁网络不断完善，但是铁路在春运期间依然是一票难求，预售期就算提前到半年，估计也仍有很多旅客买不到春运的车票。小编在这里只想问，单纯的提前，真的能解决问题吗？　　《家庭寄养管理办法》12月1日起正式实施　　寄养，有别于收养，是一种并不建立正式亲子关系的养育方式。民政部日前出台的《家庭寄养管理办法》，即将于12月1日正式实施，不但扩大了寄养儿童的范围，也提高了寄养家庭的准入门槛。　　据了解，民政部门要与寄养家庭签订寄养协议。孩子被寄养后，由于身体原因或到了该上学、该接受培训的年龄，或有人愿意收养，可能会随时解除寄养关系。　　　　此项新规一经提出，寄养儿童范围的扩大立刻引起社会各界关注。尤其是将“对流浪乞讨等生活无着未成年人承担临时监护责任的未成年人救助保护机构开展家庭寄养”，是首次将流浪儿童纳入家庭寄养的范围。　　寄养家庭准入门槛相应提高，要求寄养家庭在居住条件、收入水平、健康状况、道德品行、主要照料人年龄等方面应当具备的条件。每个家庭寄养儿童不超过二人，且该家庭无未满六岁的儿童。　　卖假药毒害孕产妇婴幼儿从重处罚　　《“两高”关于办理危害药品安全刑事案件适用法律若干问题的解释》12月1日起实施，明确了生产、销售假药、劣药应当酌情从重处罚的情形。　　从重处罚的包括生产、销售的假药以孕产妇、婴幼儿、儿童或者危重病人为主要使用对象；生产、销售的假药属于麻醉药品、精神药品、医疗用毒性药品、放射性药品、避孕药品、血液制品、疫苗生产；销售的假药属于注射剂药品、急救药品、医疗机构；医疗机构工作人员生产、销售假药；在自然灾害、事故灾难、公共卫生事件、社会安全事件等突发事件期间生产、销售用于应对突发事件的假药等情形。　　　　此次两高的“解释”中，针对生产、销售假药以孕产妇、婴幼儿、儿童或者危重病人为主要使用对象的等7种情形应当酌情从重处罚，对相关弱势群体的重点保护，更体现了国家打击制假售假、传播假药的决心。　　儿童牙刷有国标 严格限制有害元素　　日起，我国将告别没有专门适应于儿童牙刷生产标准的时代，从卫生要求、安全要求、规格尺寸、毛束强度、磨毛、饰件和外挂等方面，对儿童牙刷作出了详细规范。　　　　“牙口好，胃口才好！”看似微不足道的一个牙刷问题，却折射出相关部门的良苦用心。　　国标对儿童牙刷中有害元素要求更加严格。有害元素限量在以前砷、镉、铬、铅、汞5种的基础上，又增加了锑、钡、硒3种。平形毛型牙刷刷毛单丝顶端轮廓合格率在原有大于等于50%的基础上提高到大于等于70%，这意味着执行此项标准的儿童牙刷刷毛更柔和，不太容易损伤到儿童的口腔和牙齿。　　今后，对下一代的关怀，我们也可以具体到一把牙刷上去。
（责任编辑：HN666）
11/12 07:5010/14 21:12
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　　【免责声明】本文仅代表作者本人观点，与和讯网无关。和讯网站对文中陈述、观点判断保持中立，不对所包含内容的准确性、可靠性或完整性提供任何明示或暗示的保证。请读者仅作参考，并请自行承担全部责任。THE&GENERAL&STOCK&MARKET&IN&1983(巴菲特致股东的信，1983年）涨好翻译
1983年巴菲特给股东的信&
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致伯克希尔哈撒韦公司股东：
This past year our registered shareholders increased from about
1900 to about 2900. Most of this growth resulted from our merger
with Blue Chip Stamps, but there also was an acceleration in the
pace of “natural” increase that has raised us from the 1000 level a
few years ago.
去年我们注册的股东数由1900人增长到了2900人。大部分原因是由于我们对蓝筹印花公司的兼并所致，但这也就是像几年前我们提出的从1000人水平以“自然”步伐的加速增长。
With so many new shareholders, it’s appropriate to summarize the
major business principles we follow that pertain to the
manager-owner relationship:
有了这么多新股东，这是我们一直遵循的涉及到管理层和股东关系的主要原则的适度总结：
Although our form is&corporate, our attitude is
partnership. Charlie Munger and I think of our shareholders as
owner-partners, and of ourselves as managing partners. (Because of
the size of our shareholdings we also are, for better or worse,
controlling partners.) We do not view the company itself as the
ultimate owner of our business assets but, instead, view the
company as a conduit through which our shareholders own the
尽管我们的形式是公司，我们的态度是合作伙伴关系。芒格和我都认为我们的股东就是我们股权上的合伙人，而我们自己是执行合伙人。（由于我们拥有股权数量的规模比较大，无论是好是坏，算是控股型的合伙人）。我们不认为公司本身作为我们业务资产的最终所有者，但是，相反的，公司只是股东拥有资产的一种通道。
&In line with this owner-orientation, our
directors are all major shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway. In the
case of at least four of the five, over 50% of family net worth is
represented by holdings of Berkshire. We eat our own cooking.
在这种股东利益导向的线上，我们的董事都是伯克希尔哈撒韦的主要成员。五个董事中的四个，超过一半的家庭财产是拥有的伯克希尔的股权。我们自给自足。
&Our long-term economic goal (subject to some
qualifications mentioned later) is to maximize the average annual
rate of gain in intrinsic business value on a per-share basis. We
do not measure the economic significance or performance of
B we measure by per-share progress. We are
certain that the rate of per-share progress will diminish in the
future - a greatly enlarged capital base will see to that. But we
will be disappointed if our rate does not exceed that of the
average large American corporation.
我们长期的经济目标是在每股基础上最大化年均内在商业价值的收益（根据后面提到的一些资质）。我们没有通过的规模来衡量伯克希尔公司的经济意义或业绩表现，我们是通过每股进展来衡量的。我们相信每股进展速度将来会下降，在过大的资本基础下将看到这点。但如果我们的速度连美国工业平均水平都不能超过，我们将会很失望的。
&Our preference would be to reach this goal by
directly owning a diversified group of businesses that generate
cash and consistently earn above-average returns on capital. Our
second choice is to own parts of similar businesses, attained
primarily through purchases of marketable common stocks by our
insurance subsidiaries. The price and availability of businesses
and the need for insurance capital determine any given year’s
capital allocation.
我们倾向于通过直接拥有一个能产生现金并可以持续赚取资本高于平均水平的回报的多元化集团企业来达到这个目标。我们的第二个选择是拥有部分相同的业务，主要通过我们的保险子公司在市场上购买普通股来实现。价格和业务机会以及保险资本的需求决定了任何给定年份里的资本配置。
Because of this two-pronged approach to business ownership and
because of the limitations of conventional accounting, consolidated
reported earnings may reveal relatively little about our true
economic performance. Charlie and I, both as owners and managers,
virtually ignore such consolidated numbers. However, we will also
report to you the earnings of each major business we control,
numbers we consider of great importance. These figures, along with
other information we will supply about the individual businesses,
should generally aid you in making judgments about them。
由于通过双管齐下的办法拥有公司股权以及由于一般会计准则的限制，合并会计利润不能很好的展示我们的营业情况。查理和我，既作为管理者又作为股东，实质上是忽略这些合并数字的。然而，我们也会向所有股东汇报每一个我们主要业务的利润，我们认为很重要的。这些数字连同其它我们将提供的单个业务信息，应该都会帮助你们作出经营决策。
&Insurance Group
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&Accounting consequences do not influence our
operating or capital-allocation decisions. When acquisition costs
are similar, we much prefer to purchase $2 of earnings that is not
reportable by us under standard accounting principles than to
purchase $1 of earnings that is reportable. This is precisely the
choice that often faces us since entire businesses (whose earnings
will be fully reportable) frequently sell for double the pro-rata
price of small portions (whose earnings will be largely
unreportable). In aggregate and over time, we expect the unreported
earnings to be fully reflected in our intrinsic business value
through capital gains.
会计结果不会影响我们的经营和资本配置决策。当收购成本是一样的，我们更倾向于买入根据一般会计准则未报告的2美元利润而不是已报告的1美元利润。这是我们经常面对的选择，因为整个企业（利润全部被报告出来）经常要比小额股权按比例的价格贵2倍（利润很大部分不报）。总的来说随着时间的推移，我们希望通过资本收益在我们的内在价值里完全反映那些没报告的利润。
We rarely use much debt and, when we do, we attempt to structure
it on a long-term fixed rate basis. We will reject interesting
opportunities rather than over-leverage our balance sheet. This
conservatism has penalized our results but it is the only behavior
that leaves us comfortable, considering our fiduciary obligations
to policyholders, depositors, lenders and the many equity holders
who have committed unusually large portions of their net worth to
我们很少使用太多负债，而当我们要使用的话，我们试图建立在长期固定利率的基础上。我们将放弃一些有趣的机会而不是过度使用资产负债表。这种保守的做法已经对我们的绩效不利但却是唯一让我们感到舒服的方式，尤其是考虑到对业者、存款人、借款人以及众多投入他们大部分财富让我们照顾的股东们的责任。
A managerial “wish list” will not be filled at shareholder
expense. We will not diversify by purchasing entire businesses at
control prices that ignore long-term economic consequences to our
shareholders. We will only do with your money what we would do with
our own, weighing fully the values you can obtain by diversifying
your own portfolios through direct purchases in the stock
一个管理上的“愿望清单”将不会在股东费用里填补。我们不会对我们的股东们忽视长期经济效益以控制的价格来多样化购买全部业务。我们使用你的钱就像是使用我们自己的一样，你可以获得按比重直接通过股票市场多样化买进你的组合同样的价值。
We feel noble intentions should be checked periodically against
results. We test the wisdom of retaining earnings by assessing
whether retention, over time, delivers shareholders at least $1 of
market value for each $1 retained. To date, this test has been met.
We will continue to apply it on a five-year rolling basis. As our
net worth grows, it is more difficult to use retained earnings
我们认为好的意图应该定期检查结果。我们通过评估是否保留留存收益的智慧来测试，随着时间的推移，每1美元的留存收益至少应该带给股东1美元的市场价值。到目前为止，这种测试一直达到要求的。在五年为一个周转基础上我们将会继续应用这种方法。由于我们的净价值增长，如此明智的使用留存收益将愈加困难。
&We will issue common stock only when we
receive as much in business value as we give. This rule applies to
all forms of issuance - not only mergers or public stock offerings,
but stock for-debt swaps, stock options, and convertible securities
as well. We will not sell small portions of your company - and that
is what the issuance of shares amounts to - on a basis inconsistent
with the value of the entire enterprise.
只有当我们能收到与我们付出一样多的经济价值时，我们才会发行普通股。这一原则适用于所有的发行形式---无论是并购或公开股票发行，还有债务互换股票，股票期权，以及可转换债券也一样。如果公司整体价值与公开发行的股票不一致时，我们将不会卖出你的公司小部分---而这正是股份发行得来的---建立在和整个企业价值不符的基础上。
You should be fully aware of one attitude Charlie and I share
that hurts our financial performance: regardless of price, we have
no interest at all in selling any good businesses that Berkshire
owns, and are very reluctant to sell sub-par businesses as long as
we expect them to generate at least some cash and as long as we
feel good about their managers and labor relations. We hope not to
repeat the capital-allocation mistakes that led us into such
sub-par businesses. And we react with great caution to suggestions
that our poor businesses can be restored to satisfactory
profitability by major capital expenditures. (The projections will
be dazzling - the advocates will be sincere - but, in the end,
major additional investment in a terrible industry usually is about
as rewarding as struggling in quicksand.) Nevertheless, gin rummy
managerial behavior (discard your least promising business at each
turn) is not our style. We would rather have our overall results
penalized a bit than engage in it.
你应该充分认识到我和查理分享伤害我们的财务表现：和价格无关，我们根本没有兴趣出售任何伯克希尔公司拥有的好生意，也非常舍不得卖掉次级的生意只要我们预期它们能产生至少一点点的现金或者只要我们感到他们的管理层与劳工关系很好。我们希望不要重复那个导致我们进入次级生意的资本配置错误。同时我们以非常谨慎的反应来建议我们差的生意能够通过大量的资本支出恢复到满意的盈利水平（规划将是令人眼花缭乱的---提议者将是真诚的---但是---最后，新增投资在可怕的行业中通常会获得像挣扎在流沙上一样的回报）。无论怎样，杜松子酒般的管理行为（在每一次都放弃你最没希望的生意）不是我们的风格。我们宁愿全部业绩受损一点也不愿去参与它。
&We will be candid in our reporting to you,
emphasizing the pluses and minuses important in appraising business
value. Our guideline is to tell you the business facts that we
would want to know if our positions were reversed. We owe you no
less. Moreover, as a company with a major communications business,
it would be inexcusable for us to apply lesser standards of
accuracy, balance and incisiveness when reporting on ourselves than
we would expect our news people to apply when reporting on others.
We also believe candor benefits us as managers: the CEO who
misleads others in public may eventually mislead himself in
我们将会在我们的报告中坦诚地对你们，尤其是强调在评价商业价值时优缺点的重要性。我们的导向是要告诉你，我们想知道如果我们的经济地位互换的商业事实。毫无疑问我们欠你的。此外，作为一家大型的媒体公司，，当比起我们预期我们的新闻人报告其他人时以更低的精确性，平衡性和鲜明的标准对我们自己报告时，这是不可原谅的。我们也相信诚实坦白有利于我们作为管理者：在公开误导其他人的CEO可能最终会在私下也误导了自己。
&Despite our policy of candor, we will discuss
our activities in marketable securities only to the extent legally
required. Good investment ideas are rare, valuable and subject to
competitive appropriation just as good product or business
acquisition ideas are. Therefore, we normally will not talk about
our investment ideas. This ban extends even to securities we have
sold (because we may purchase them again) and to stocks we are
incorrectly rumored to be buying. If we deny those reports but say
“no comment” on other occasions, the no-comments become
confirmation.
尽管采用坦诚的政策，我们将讨论的我们在证券市场的活动仅在法律规定的范围内。好的投资主意非常稀少，有价值的并得到竞争性拨款就象是获得好产品或者好生意的主意那样。因此，我们通常不会谈论我们的投资主意。这个禁令甚至扩展到我们已经出售的股票（因为我们很可能会再次买进它们）以及错误的谣传我们将要买进的股票。如果我否认这些报道但在其它场合说“无可奉告”，那么这些无可奉告就会变成确定。
That completes the catechism, and we can now move on to the high
point of 1983 - the acquisition of a majority interest in Nebraska
Furniture Mart and our association with Rose Blumkin and her
结束教条主义，现在我们就转到1983年的重点---购并Nebraska 家具商场的主要股权以及我们与Rose
Blumkin和她家族的联合。
Nebraska Furniture Mart
Nebraska家具商场
Last year, in discussing how managers with bright, but
adrenalin-soaked minds scramble after foolish acquisitions, I
quoted Pascal: “It has struck me that all the misfortunes of men
spring from the single cause that they are unable to stay quietly
in one room.” Even Pascal would have left the room for Mrs.
Blumkin. About 67 years ago Mrs. Blumkin, then 23, talked her way
past a border guard to leave Russia for America. She had no formal
education, not even at the grammar school level, and knew no
English. After some years in this country, she learned the language
when her older daughter taught her, every evening, the words she
had learned in school during the day.
去年，在讨论经理们多么有聪明才智，除了在肾上腺素浸透的愚蠢购并后，我们引用Pascal的话:
“它让我吃惊的是所有的人类不幸的唯一原因是因为他们无法安静的待在一个房间内”，但即使是Pascal也会为了Blumkin女士离开那个房间。大约67年前，当Blumkin女士23岁时，靠她一张嘴说服边界警卫逃离俄国来到美国。她从未接受过正式教育，连小学也没有，也不懂英文。在这个国家许多年后，靠着她的大女儿每晚教她，学习白天在学校所学的每一个单词。
In 1937, after many years of selling used clothing, Mrs. Blumkin
had saved $500 with which to realize her dream of opening a
furniture store. Upon seeing the American Furniture Mart in Chicago
- then the center of the nation’s wholesale furniture activity -
she decided to christen her dream Nebraska Furniture Mart.She met
every obstacle you would expect (and a few you would’t) when a
business endowed with only $500 and no locational or product
advantage goes up against rich, long-entrenched competition. At one
early point, when her tiny resources ran out, “Mrs. B” (a personal
trademark now as well recognized in Greater Omaha as Coca-Cola or
Sanka) coped in a way not taught at business schools: she simply
sold the furniture and appliances from her home in order to pay
creditors precisely as promised.
1937年，Blumkin女士靠着多年卖二手衣服攒了500美元实现了她开一个家具店的梦想。参考了在芝加哥的全美最大的家具商场-全国批发市场中心-她决定将自己的梦想之店命名为Nebraska家具商场。之后她遭遇到你所能预期的各种困难(也有一些你想不到的)，以仅有的500美金起家没有任何地理或产品上的优势地去对抗资金雄厚、经营已久的同业竞争，在早期，当她有限的资源耗费光时，“Mrs.
B”(这个个人商标在大奥马哈地区与可口可乐齐名)甚至把家中的家具和电器等东西变卖以支付弥足珍贵的信誉。
Omaha retailers began to recognize that Mrs. B would offer
customers far better deals than they had been giving, and they
pressured furniture and carpet manufacturers not to sell to her.
But by various strategies she obtained merchandise and cut prices
sharply. Mrs. B was then hauled into court for violation of Fair
Trade laws. She not only won all the cases, but received invaluable
publicity. At the end of one case, after demonstrating to the court
that she could profitably sell carpet at a huge discount from the
prevailing price, she sold the judge $1400 worth of carpet. Today
Nebraska Furniture Mart generates over $100 million of sales
annually out of one 200,000 square-foot store. No other home
furnishings store in the country comes close to that volume. That
single store also sells more furniture, carpets, and appliances
than do all Omaha competitors combined.
奥马哈的零售商开始注意到B太太可以给顾客比他们更低的价格时，便向家具及地毯工厂施压不要供货给B太太。但靠着各种不同的方法，她还是取得货源并大幅降价。B太太甚至因此而被告到法院说她是违反公平交易法。她不但赢得所有官司，更大大扩大了知名度。在其中一个案件的最后，在法庭中为了证明即使以现行市价打一个大折扣后，她仍有所获利，结果她卖了一条1400元地毯给法官。今天Nebraska
家具商场在一家20万平米的店面里每年获得了超过1亿美元的收入。全美没有任何一家零售家具店可以达到这个数量。它一家店所卖的家具、地毯与家电用品比奥马哈所有其它店家加起来还多。
One question I always ask myself in appraising a business is how
I would like, assuming I had ample capital and skilled personnel,
to compete with it. I’d rather wrestle grizzlies than compete with
Mrs. B and her progeny. They buy brilliantly, they operate at
expense ratios competitors don’t even dream about, and they then
pass on to their customers much of the savings. It’s the ideal
business - one built upon exceptional value to the customer that in
turn translates into exceptional economics for its owners.
在评断一家我有多喜欢这家公司企业价值时，我总是问自己一个问题:
“假设我有足够的资金与人才时，我愿不愿意和这家公司竞争”，我宁愿和大灰熊摔跤也不愿和B太太家族竞争。他们明智的采购，经营费用低到其竞争对手想都不敢想的程度，然后再将所省下的每一分钱回馈给客人。这是一家理想的企业---是在给顾客建立卓越价值后又能给所有者带来卓越的经济利益。
Mrs. B is wise as well as smart and, for far-sighted family
reasons, was willing to sell the business last year. I had admired
both the family and the business for decades, and a deal was
quickly made. But Mrs. B, now 90, is not one to go home and risk,
as she puts it, “losing her marbles”. She remains Chairman and is
on the sales floor seven days a week. Carpet sales are her
specialty. She personally sells quantities that would be a good
departmental total for other carpet retailers. We purchased 90% of
the business - leaving 10% with members of the family who are
involved in management - and have optioned 10% to certain key young
family managers.
B太太是明智和聪明的并且,因为远见与家族的原因，愿意于去年出让公司。我对这个家族与其生意已欣赏了数十年，整个交易很快便敲定。但现在九十岁的B太太，并没有马上回家休息远离风险，如同她所说的，“失去她的斗志”，她仍继续保留担任公司的主席，每周七天都待在卖场现场。其中销售地毯更是她的擅长。她个人的业绩便足以打败所有其它地毯零售业者。我们一共买下90%股权---留下的10%由原有家族成员作为管理层拥有---另还预留10%的认购权给主要的年轻管理者。&
And what managers they are. Geneticists should do handsprings
over the Blumkin family. Louie Blumkin, Mrs. B’s son, has been
President of Nebraska Furniture Mart for many years and is widely
regarded as the shrewdest buyer of furniture and appliances in the
country. Louie says he had the best teacher, and Mrs. B says she
had the best student. They’re both right. Louie and his three sons
all have the Blumkin business ability, work ethic, and, most
important, character. On top of that, they are really nice people.
We are delighted to be in partnership with them.
他们是多好的管理层。遗传学家应好好研究Blumkin家族。Louie Blumkin ， B太太的儿子担任Nebraska
家具公司的总经理已有好多年且被广泛认为是全国最精明的家具与家电用品的采购者。他说因为他有最好的老师，而B太太则说她有最优秀的学生。两人的说法都正确。Louie
跟他三个儿子都继承了Blumkin家族生意能力、勤奋工作，且，最重要的，人格特质。总的来说，他们实在是不错的人。我们很高兴能与他们一起合作。
Corporate&Performance
公司业绩表现
During 1983 our book value increased from $737.43 per share to
$975.83 per share, or by 32%. We never take the one-year figure
very seriously. After all, why should the time required for a
planet to circle the sun synchronize precisely with the time
required for business actions to pay off? Instead, we recommend not
less than a five-year test as a rough yardstick of economic
performance. Red lights should start flashing if the five-year
average annual gain falls much below the return on equity earned
over the period by American industry in aggregate. (Watch out for
our explanation if that occurs as Goethe observed, “When ideas
fail, words come in very handy.”)
1983年我们的账面净值由原来每股737美元增加到975美元，约32%。我们从未把单年的数字表现看得太认真。毕竟，为什么需要生意运营的行动与行星绕行太阳转的一样精确呢？相反的，我们建议不要少于五年为一周期作为一个评断经济表现的尺度。若五年的年平均收益要远低于合计的美国企业平均水平，就需要闪起红灯了。(如果就像歌德Goethe所观察到的那样发生，注意我们的解释，“万一想法失败了，理由可能来的非常容易”)
During the 19-year tenure of present management, book value has
grown from $19.46 per share to $975.83, or 22.6% compounded
annually. Considering our present size, nothing close to this rate
of return can be sustained. Those who believe otherwise should
pursue a career in sales, but avoid one in mathematics. We report
our progress in terms of book value because in our case (though
not, by any means, in all cases) it is a conservative but
reasonably adequate proxy for growth in intrinsic business value -
the measurement that really counts. Book value’s virtue as a
score-keeping measure is that it is easy to calculate and doesn’t
involve the subjective (but important) judgments employed in
calculation of intrinsic business value. It is important to
understand, however, that the two terms - book value and intrinsic
business value - have very different meanings.
在现有管理的19年任期内，帐面价值已由每股19美元增加到975美元，约等于22.6%年复合增长率。考虑到我们现有的规模，未来可能无法持续这么高的回报率。信它的人不然去选择去当销售员，但不要数字。我们之所以根据帐面价值来报告我们的进展因为以我们的情况(虽然不是,以所有情况,任何情况都这样)它是一个保守的但又合理的充分代表对于衡量内含价值的成长---真正算数的测量方式。账面价值作为测评分数的好处是它很容易计算并且在计算内在业务价值时不牵涉到（但很重要）采用的主管判断。很重要需要理解的是，然而，这两个词---账面价值和内在商业价值---有非常不同的含义。
Book value is an accounting concept, recording the accumulated
financial input from both contributed capital and retained
earnings. Intrinsic business value is an economic concept,
estimating future cash output discounted to present value. Book
value tells you
intrinsic business value
estimates what can be taken out.
帐面价值是会计概念，记录从实收资本和留存收益中累积的资金投入；内含价值是一个经济概念，估计未来现金产出折现为现值。账面价值告诉你有多少已被投入，而内在商业价值预测了将来能获取多少。
An analogy will suggest the difference. Assume you spend
identical amounts putting each of two children through college. The
book value (measured by financial input) of each child’s education
would be the same. But the present value of the future payoff (the
intrinsic business value) might vary enormously - from zero to many
times the cost of the education. So, also, do businesses having
equal financial input end up with wide variations in value.
一个类比能解释这其中的不同。假设你花费相同的钱来供两个小孩读大学。每个小孩的账面价值（以财务投入计量）相同。但未来能获得回报的现值（即内含价值）可能会有很大的差异---从零到所付出教育成本的很多倍都有可能。因此，同样的，在生意上有着相同的财务投入最终在价值也会差很多。
At Berkshire, at the beginning of fiscal 1965 when the present
management took over, the $19.46 per share book value considerably
overstated intrinsic business value. All of that book value
consisted of textile assets that could not earn, on average,
anything close to an appropriate rate of return. In the terms of
our analogy, the investment in textile assets resembled investment
in a largely-wasted education. Now, however, our intrinsic business
value considerably exceeds book value. There are two major
在伯克希尔公司，在1965年刚开始由现在的管理层刚接管时，帐面价值为每股19.46美元，明显高于内含价值。所有的那些帐面价值都是那些不能赚钱的纺织资产，平均而言，任何都是接近一个适当的回报率。根据我们之前的类比上，投资在纺织资产就和投资在很大浪费的教育一样。
如今，我们的内含价值已大幅超越帐面价值，主要的原因有两点:
Standard accounting principles require that common stocks held by
our insurance subsidiaries be stated on our books at market value,
but that other stocks we own be carried at the lower of aggregate
cost or market. At the end of 1983, the market value of this latter
group exceeded carrying value by $70 million pre-tax, or about $50
million after tax. This excess belongs in our intrinsic business
value, but is not included in the calculation of book value
(1)标准会计原则要求我们保险子公司所持有的普通股以市价记录于帐面上，但我们拥有的其它股票却以成本与市价孰低法计算。到1983年底为止，后者的市价超过帐面价值税前7000万美金，或税后5000万美金之多。超过的部份属于我们内含价值，但不包含在帐面价值之内。
(2) More important, we own several businesses that possess
economic Goodwill (which is properly includable in intrinsic
business value) far larger than the accounting Goodwill that is
carried on our balance sheet and reflected in book value. Goodwill,
both economic and accounting, is an arcane subject and requires
more explanation than is appropriate here. The appendix that
follows this letter - “Goodwill and its Amortization: The Rules and
The Realities” - explains why economic and accounting Goodwill can,
and usually do, differ enormously.
&(2)更重要的是，我们拥有的几家具有经济商誉的公司(真正的包含在内含价值之内)远大于记载在我们资产负债表和反应在账面价值上的会计商誉。商誉，无论是经济上的还是会计上的，都是一个神秘的主题并且比现在需要更多的解释。在这封信后的附录里---“商誉及商誉的摊销：规则与现实”---解释了为什么经济上和会计上的商誉能够，且通常是，会有如此大的差距。
You can live a full and rewarding life without ever thinking
about Goodwill and its amortization. But students of investment and
management should understand the nuances of the subject. My own
thinking has changed drastically from 35 years ago when I was
taught to favor tangible assets and to shun businesses whose value
depended largely upon economic Goodwill. This bias caused me to
make many important business mistakes of omission, although
relatively few of commission.
你可以不考虑商誉及其摊销而获得充实而有意义的生活。但投资管理系的学生需要懂得这学科的细微差异。我自己的思想也与35年前有了很大的改变，那时我受到的教育是偏向于有形资产并回避依赖大量商誉的企业。这种偏见导致我犯了遗漏许多重要生意的错误，尽管相对佣金很少。
Keynes identified my problem: “The difficulty lies not in the
new ideas but in escaping from the old ones.” My escape was long
delayed, in part because most of what I had been taught by the same
teacher had been (and continues to be) so extraordinarily valuable.
Ultimately, business experience, direct and vicarious, produced my
present strong preference for businesses that possess large amounts
of enduring Goodwill and that utilize a minimum of tangible
凯恩斯定义了我的问题：“困难不在于接受新的想法而在于摆脱那些旧的观念。”我摆脱旧观念的时间被大大延迟了，一部分原因是同一个一直教导我的老师教授的东西很有价值（并将继续是），显得格外珍贵。最终，生意经验，不管是直接的还是间接的，都使得我产生了现在强烈的生意偏好，即拥有大量持久的商誉以及运用一个最少的有形资产的公司。
I recommend the Appendix to those who are comfortable with
accounting terminology and who have an interest in understanding
the business aspects of Goodwill. Whether or not you wish to tackle
the Appendix, you should be aware that Charlie and I believe that
Berkshire possesses very significant economic Goodwill value above
that reflected in our book value.
我建议那些熟悉会计术语且对理解商誉的业务方面有一点兴趣的人读读附录。不论是或不是你希望应付附录，你都应该意识到查理跟我都认为伯克希尔公司拥有比反应在我们的帐面价值更高的经济商誉价值。
1983 Sources of Reported Earnings
1983年盈利报告
The table below shows the sources of Berkshire’s reported
earnings.& In 1982, Berkshire owned about 60% of
Blue Chip Stamps whereas, in 1983, our ownership was 60% throughout
the first six months and 100% thereafter.& In
turn, Berkshire’s net interest in Wesco was 48% during 1982 and the
first six months of 1983, and 80% for the balance of
1983.& Because of these changed ownership
percentages, the first two columns of the table provide the best
measure of underlying business performance.
下面的表格显示了伯克希尔报告收益的来源。在1982年，伯克希尔拥有蓝筹印花公司60%的股票，而在1983年，我们在前六个月拥有60%的股权，而之后是100%的股权。因此，伯克希尔在威斯科金融公司在1982年和1983年的前六个月的股权是48%，而在1983年的剩余时间达到了80%。因为这些所有权百分比的改变，这个表格的最前两列提供了衡量当下公司表现的最好指标。
All of the significant gains and losses attributable to unusual
sales of assets by any of the business entities are aggregated with
securities transactions on the line near the bottom of the table,
and are not included in operating earnings. (We regard any annual
figure for realized capital gains or losses as meaningless, but we
regard the aggregate realized and unrealized capital gains over a
period of years as very important.) Furthermore, amortization of
Goodwill is not charged against the specific businesses but, for
reasons outlined in the Appendix, is set forth as a separate
所有显著的收益和任何商业主体不寻常出售资产的损失，都被集中在表格下端的证券交易行中，这里面不包括运营收益。（我们认为为了实现资产收益或损失任何的年度数据都没有意义，但是我们认为已实现的总量和未实现的资本收益在几年的时间里是非常重要的。）更重要的是，商誉摊销没有冲减的具体产业，但在附录中有提到的原因，是作为一个单独的项目被提出来。
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
Earnings Before Income
&&&Net Earnings
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
Total&&&&&&&&&
Berkshire Share
单位：千美元&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
1983&& 1982&
&&&&&&1983&&&&&
保险集团：
$(11,345 )
净投资收益
伯克希尔-Waumbec 纺织业
联合零售商店.
内布拉斯加家具卖场（1）
布法罗晚间新闻
蓝筹印花公司（2）
韦斯科金融公司母公司
互助存贷公司
精密钢铁公司
盖可保险特殊分配
经营收入总计
证券销售和非经营性收入
(1)十月至12月
(2) 1982 和 1983的数据不可比较，因为大部分资产在合并中进行过转移。
For a discussion of the businesses owned by Wesco, please read
Charlie Munger’s report on pages 46-51.& Charlie
replaced Louie Vincenti as Chairman of Wesco late in 1983 when
forced Louie’s retirement at age 77.& In some
instances, “health” is a euphemism, but in Louie’s case nothing but
health would cause us to consider his retirement.&
Louie is a marvelous man and has been a marvelous manager.
如果想要讨论韦斯科公司，请阅读报告46—51页查理·芒格的报告。查理在1983年后期代替了路易·文森蒂担任韦斯科的首席执行官，当健康问题令路易在77岁时退休。在某些情况下，“健康”是一个委婉的说法，但在路易身上除了健康理由没有别的能让我们让他退休。路易是一个非凡的人，也是一个非凡的管理者。
The special GEICO distribution reported in the table arose when
that company made a tender offer for a portion of its stock, buying
both from us and other shareholders.& At GEICO’s
we tendered a quantity of shares that kept our ownership
percentage the same after the transaction as
&&nature of our sale permitted us
to treat the proceeds as a dividend.& Unlike
individuals, corporations net considerably more when earnings are
derived from dividends rather than from capital gains, since the
effective Federal income tax rate on dividends is 6.9% versus 28%
on capital gains.
盖可公司特别的出现在报告中是因为它想要收购一部分它的股票，无论从我们这里买还是另外的固定那里买。按照盖可公司的要求，我们招标了让我们的所有权在交易前后保持不变的数量。我们销售性质允许我们把这个收益看做是股息。不像个人那样，公司从股息分红而不是资本利得中获得了更多的净收益，因为联邦所得税率在股息上征收6.9%，而在资产里的上征收28%。
Even with this special item added in, our total dividends from
GEICO in 1983 were considerably less than our share of GEICO’s
earnings.& Thus it is perfectly appropriate, from
both an accounting and economic standpoint, to include the
redemption proceeds in our reported earnings.& It
is because the item is large and unusual that we call your
attention to it.
即使有这个特殊项目加入，我们在1983年从盖可公司获得的总股息收入也比我们盖可公司持股收益少得多。因此它是非常合适的，无论从会计还是经济角度来看，包括在我们报告盈利中赎回收益。因为这个项目非常大且不寻常，我们让你们对它留意。
The table showing you our sources of earnings includes dividends
from those non-controlled companies whose marketable equity
securities we own.& But the table does not include
earnings those companies have retained that are applicable to our
ownership.& In aggregate and over time we expect
those undistributed earnings to be reflected in market prices and
to increase our intrinsic business value on a dollar-for-dollar
basis, just as if those earnings had been under our control and
reported as part of our profits.& That does not
mean we expect all of our holdings some will
disappoint us, others will deliver pleasant
surprises.& To date our experience has been better
than we originally anticipated, In aggregate, we have received far
more than a dollar of market value gain for every dollar of
earnings retained.
这个表格向你们展示了我们的盈利来源，包括那些我们拥有的非控制公司的市场权益证券得的分红。但是这个表格没包括那些公司留存的但也属于我们所有权的收益。总得来说随着时间的推移，我们希望这些未分配盈余能够反映在市场价格上并且在一美元对一美元的基础上增加我们的内在商业价值，就像这些收益已经在我们的控制下并作为我们收益的一部分报告。那并不意味着我们期望我们持有的持有行为是一致的，有些股票会让我们失望，其他则会给我们意想不到的惊喜。目前为止我们的经历已经比最初预料的好，总的来说，我们已经收到每一美元的市场价值收益比留存收益要大的多。
The following table shows our 1983 yearend net holdings in
marketable equities.& All numbers represent 100%
of Berkshire’s holdings, and 80% of Wesco’s
holdings.& The portion attributable to minority
shareholders of Wesco has been excluded.
下面的表格展示了我们在1983年末在可交易市场上净持有值。所有的数字代表了伯克希尔持有100%股权的和韦斯科股权的80%。韦斯科的少数股权并未包含进去。
附属出版公司
通用食品公司
Handy & Harman公司
埃培智集团
通用传媒公司
奥美·马瑟国际公司
R. J. 雷诺斯工业
华盛顿邮储银行
$1,287,869
其他普通股
普通股总计
$1,305,913
(a) 韦斯科公司在这些公司中持有股权。
Based upon present holdings and present dividend rates &excluding
any special items such as the GEICO proportional redemption last
year - we would expect reported dividends from this group to be
approximately $39 million in 1984.& We can also
make a very rough guess about the earnings this group will retain
that will be attributable to our ownership: these may total about
$65 million for the year.& These retained earnings
could well have no immediate effect on market prices of the
securities.&Over time, however, we feel they will
have real meaning.
基于当前的持有股票和股息率，不包含任何像盖可公司去年的赎回收益这样的特殊项目——我们期待在1984年从这类中取得大于3900万美元的记录股息。我们同样也可以对这类将留存的收益对我们所有权的贡献进行一个粗略的估计：这些今年可能总计6500万美元。这些留存收益在证券的市场价格上可能没有立刻生效。然而，很长时间后，我们觉得它们会有真正的意义。
In addition to the figures already supplied, information regarding
the businesses we control appears in Management’s Discussion on
pages 40-44.& The most significant of these are
Buffalo Evening News, See’s, and the Insurance Group, to which we
will give some special attention here.
除了已经提供的数据，关于我们控制公司的信息在40-44页的管理层讨论上有。这些里面最重要的是布法罗晚报、喜事糖果和保险集团，对这些我们特别注意。
Buffalo Evening News
布法罗晚报/水牛城晚报
First, a clarification: our corporate name is Buffalo Evening News,
Inc. but the name of the newspaper, since we began a morning
edition a little over a year ago, is Buffalo News.
首先，一点澄清：我们公司的名称是水牛城晚报新闻公司，不是报纸的名字，因为我们在一年前开设了一个晨报版的，那是水牛城新闻。
In 1983 the News somewhat exceeded its targeted profit margin of
10% after tax.& Two factors were responsible: (1)
a state income tax cost that was subnormal because of a large loss
carry-forward, now fully utilized, and (2) a large drop in the
per-ton cost of newsprint (an unanticipated fluke that will be
reversed in 1984).
在1983年，水牛城新闻报的税后收益在某些程度上超过了目标利润的10%。两个因素：（1）州收入所得税成本非常低，因为有一大笔前期亏损，现在被充分的利用；（2）新闻用纸的每吨成本大幅下降（这是一个意外的侥幸，在1984年可能会相反）
Although our profit margins in 1983 were about average for
newspapers such as the News, the paper’s performance, nevertheless,
was a significant achievement considering the economic and
retailing environment in Buffalo.
尽管我们在1983年的利润率只达到了报纸的平均水平，就像《新闻报》，和媒体的表现，然而，考虑到水牛城的经济和零售环境，这已是一个很出色的成绩了。
Buffalo has a concentration of heavy industry, a segment of the
economy that was hit particularly hard by the recent recession and
that has lagged the recovery.& As Buffalo
consumers have suffered, so also have the paper’s retailing
customers.&Their numbers have shrunk over the past
few years and many of those surviving have cut their linage.
水牛城是重工业的聚集地，这部分经济尤其被最近的不景气打击地很严重，滞后了复苏。就像水牛城消费者已经经历过的，报纸的零售消费者也经历了同样的情况。他们的数量在过去几年里缩减很厉害，而且他们当中留下也削减了他们的行数。
Within this environment the News has one exceptional strength: its
acceptance by the public, a matter measured by the paper’s
“penetration ratio” - the percentage of households within the
community purchasing the paper each day.& Our
ratio is superb: for the six months ended September 30, 1983 the
News stood number one in weekday penetration among the 100
papers in the United States (the ranking is based on “city zone”
numbers compiled by the Audit Bureau of Circulations).
在这样的环境中新闻有一个特殊的力量：被公众接纳，通过测量报纸的“渗透率”的事---社区中每天购买报纸住户的百分比。我们的比率是非常好的：到日底的六个月中，水牛城新闻报每周在全美最大的100家报纸中始终占据第一（这个排名由发行量审核署依照“城市区域数量”编辑的）
In interpreting the standings, it is important to note that many
large cities have two papers, and that in such cases the
penetration of either paper is necessarily lower than if there were
a single paper, as in Buffalo.& Nevertheless, the
list of the 100 largest papers includes many that have a city to
themselves.& Among these, the News is at the top
nationally, far ahead of many of the country’s best-known
在解释榜上，值得注意的是很多大城市有两份报纸，这是重要的，在这种情况下的每一份报纸的渗透率必然比只有单一一家报纸要低，就像在水牛城一样。然而，在这100家最大报纸中也包含很多一个城市只有一家公司的情况。在这些中，水牛城报纸在全国是最好的，远比那些很多出名的日报要好。
Among Sunday editions of these same large dailies, the News ranks
number three in penetration - ten to twenty percentage points ahead
of many well-known papers.& It was not always this
way in Buffalo. Below we show Sunday circulation in Buffalo in the
years prior to 1977 compared with the present
period.& In that earlier period the Sunday paper
was the Courier-Express (the News was not then publishing a Sunday
paper).& Now, of course, it is the News.
在这些同样是大报纸的周日版，水牛城报纸在渗透率上排名第三，比很多知名报纸要高10%到20%。在水牛城并不总是这样。在下面我们展示1977年前水牛城的周日版的流通量，并与现在对比。在早期，周日报是印刷标准（水牛城报那时候还没印周日版）。现在，当然，水牛城报纸是印刷标准。
周日报平均发行量
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
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&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
&&&&&&&1984
We believe a paper’s penetration ratio to be the best measure of
the strength of its franchise.& Papers with
unusually high penetration in the geographical area that is of
prime interest to major local retailers, and with relatively little
circulation elsewhere, are exceptionally efficient buys for those
retailers.& Low-penetration papers have a far less
compelling message to present to advertisers.
我们相信一份报纸的渗透率是衡量特权力量的最佳指标。在拥有不寻常高渗透率区域的报纸对大多数当地零售商来说有大的吸引力，且相对别处很低发行量的报纸，对这些零售商是特别的有效的购买。低渗透率的报纸对于广告商是远不能引人注意的信息。
In our opinion, three factors largely account for the unusual
acceptance of the News in the community.& Among
these, points 2 and 3 also may explain the popularity of the Sunday
News compared to that of the Sunday Courier-Express when it was the
sole Sunday paper:
我们认为水牛城报纸在社区不寻常很大考虑被接受的三个因素。在这里面，第二点和第三点同样也可以解释当Courier-Express是唯一周日报纸时相比周日版的受欢迎程度。
(1) The first point has nothing to do with merits of the
News.& Both emigration and immigration are
relatively low in Buffalo. A stable population is more interested
and involved in the activities of its community than is a shifting
population - and, as a result, is more interested in the content of
the local daily paper.&Increase the movement in
and out of a city and penetration ratios will fall.
（1）第一点和水牛城报纸的优势无关。水牛城的居民移出和移入都非常少。一个稳定的人口比流动的人口对它的社区活动更有趣并更参与---而且，结果，因此对当地每天的报纸内容就会更感兴趣。城市移出和移入的流动增加将会导致渗透率的下降。
(2) The News has a reputation for editorial quality and integrity
that was honed by our longtime editor, the legendary Alfred
Kirchhofer, and that has been preserved and extended by Murray
Light.& This reputation was enormously important
to our success in establishing a Sunday paper against entrenched
competition.& And without a Sunday edition, the
News would not have survived in the long run.
（2）水牛城报纸已经有一个编辑质量和由我们的资深编辑磨练出来的正直荣誉，这由阿尔佛雷德·奇士霍夫创立并由莫里保持和发展。这个荣誉对我们成功创立周日报并打败固有竞争者非常重要。如果没有周日报，水牛城报纸不会在长期经营中生存下来。
(3) The News lives up to its name - it delivers a very unusual
amount of news. During 1983, our “news hole” (editorial material -
not ads) amounted to 50% of the newspaper’s content (excluding
preprinted inserts).&Among papers that dominate
their markets and that are of comparable or larger size, we know of
only one whose news hole percentage exceeds that of the
News.& Comprehensive figures are not available,
but a sampling indicates an average percentage in the high
30s.& In other words, page&for
page, our mix gives readers over 25% more news than the typical
paper.& This news-rich mixture is by
intent.&Some publishers, pushing for higher profit
margins, have cut their news holes during the past
decade.& We have maintained ours and will continue
to do so.& Properly written and edited, a full
serving of news makes our paper more valuable to the reader and
contributes to our unusual penetration ratio.
（3）水牛城报纸没有辜负他的名字---它传递了大量的新闻。在1983年，我们的“新闻版面”（编辑资料---不是广告）达到了报纸内容的一半（不包括预插入版）。在占主导地位的市场且相比更大尺寸的报纸中，我们知道只有一家报纸的新闻版面超过了水牛城报纸。综合数据无法公布，但抽查调查表明平均高出30%。换句话说，一张一张看，我们的组合给读者提供了超过典型报纸25%的内容。内容丰富是有目的的。有些出版商，奋力追组更高的利润，在过去十年里不断减少他们的新闻版面。我们坚持我们的并将继续这样做。正确地书写和编辑，全面提供新闻让我们的报纸对读者来说更有价值并对我们不寻常的渗透率有贡献。
Despite the strength of the News’ franchise, gains in ROP linage
(advertising printed within the newspaper pages as contrasted to
preprinted inserts) are going to be very difficult to
achieve.& We had an enormous gain in preprints
during 1983: lines rose from 9.3 million to 16.4 million, revenues
from $3.6 million to $8.1 million.& These gains
are consistent with national trends, but exaggerated in our case by
business we picked up when the Courier-Express closed.
尽管水牛城报纸的特许力量很强，在ROP（在报纸上印刷广告，与事前印好的插页相对应）方面的收益正变得非常困难。我们1983年在预印方面上有很大的收益：数量从930万增长到1640万，收入从360万美元增至810万美元。这些收益与全国趋势一致，但因为在Courier-Express关闭时收购了其业务我们的这一情况有些夸大。
On balance, the shift from ROP to preprints has negative
economic implications for us.& Profitability on
preprints is less and the business is more subject to competition
from alternative means of delivery.& Furthermore,
a reduction in ROP linage means less absolute space devoted to news
(since the news hole percentage remains constant), thereby reducing
the utility of the paper to the reader.
总的来说，从ROP到预印本的转变对我们有负的经济影响。预印版的盈利能力低且该生意更多地受制于可选择运输工具的竞争情况。此外，在ROP方面的减少意味着更少的绝对空间可以留给新闻（因为新闻板块所占的比例保持一致），因此对读者实用性也会减少。
Stan Lipsey became Publisher of the Buffalo News at midyear upon
the retirement of Henry Urban.& Henry never
flinched during the dark days of litigation and losses following
our introduction of the Sunday paper - an introduction whose wisdom
was questioned by many in the newspaper business, including some
within our own building.& Henry is admired by the
Buffalo business community, he’s admired by all who worked for him,
and he is admired by Charlie and me.& Stan worked
with Henry for several years, and has worked for Berkshire Hathaway
since 1969.& He has been personally involved in
all nuts-and-bolts aspects of the newspaper business from editorial
to circulation.& We couldn’t do better.
斯坦·利普西在亨利退休后于年中成为水牛城报纸的出版商。亨利在引入周末班后充满诉讼和损失的黑暗期从不退缩---一个在新闻界被质疑很多的引进，包括很多来自我们自己公司的。亨利被水牛城公司钦佩，他同时被所有为他工作的人、查理以及我所钦佩。斯坦和亨利一起工作过很多年，并从1969年后开始为伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司工作。他已经亲自参与报纸从编辑到发行的各种细节事物，我们无法做得更好了。
See’s Candy Shops
The financial results at See’s continue to be
exceptional.&The business possesses a valuable and
solid consumer franchise and a manager equally valuable and
喜事糖果的经营成果继续亮丽。这个公司拥有非常有价值且固定的消费者，还有管理层同样也很有价值且稳定。
In recent years See’s has encountered two important problems, at
least one of which is well on its way toward
solution.& That problem concerns costs, except
those for raw materials.& We have enjoyed a break
on raw material costs in recent years though so, of course, have
our competitors.& One of these days we will get a
nasty surprise in the opposite direction.& In
effect, raw material costs are largely beyond our control since we
will, as a matter of course, buy the finest ingredients that we
can, regardless of changes in their price levels.&
We regard product quality as sacred.
最近几年里喜氏糖果遇到了两个重大的问题，至少其中一个正在被解决。这个难题与成本有关，不过不是指原材料成本。我们这些年在原材料成本上享受一会儿，当然，我们的竞争者也一样。总有一天我们将在相反的方向得到讨厌的惊喜。实际上，原材料成本很大程度上不受我们控制，因为我们将，理所当然，买我们所能买到的最好材料，而不管它们价格的变化。我们认为产品的质量非常神圣。
But other kinds of costs are more controllable, and it is in this
area that we have had problems.& On a per-pound
basis, our costs (not including those for raw materials) have
increased in the last few years at a rate significantly greater
than the increase in the general price level.& It
is vital to our competitive position and profit potential that we
reverse this trend.
但是其他的成本是更容易控制的，而正是在这个领域我们遇到了难题。在每磅的基础上，我们的成本（不包括原材料）在过去几年里比一般价格水平增加的快得多。逆转这个趋势对我们的竞争位置和盈利能力非常重要。
In recent months much better control over costs has been attained
and we feel certain that our rate of growth in these costs in 1984
will be below the rate of inflation.& This
confidence arises out of our long experience with the managerial
talents of Chuck Huggins.& We put Chuck in charge
the day we took over, and his record has been simply extraordinary,
as shown by the following table:
在最近几个月里控制成本已经好很多了，我们感觉比较确信在1984年我们在这些成本上的增长率将会比通货膨胀率低。这份自信源于我们对查克·哈根斯管理才能的长期经验。我们让查克接管工作，他的记录非常出色，正如下表所示。
& 52-53 周&&
大约12.31日结束&&&&
税后经营收入
糖果销售数量
年末开店数量
1983 (53周)
$133,531,000
$13,699,000
24,651,000
1982 ..............
123,662,000
11,875,000
24,216,000
1981 ..............
112,578,000
10,779,000
24,052,000
1980 ..............
97,715,000
24,065,000
1979 ..............
87,314,000
23,985,000
1978 ..............
73,653,000
22,407,000
1977 ..............
62,886,000
20,921,000
1976 (53 周)
56,333,000
20,553,000
1975 ..............
50,492,000
19,134,000
1974 ..............
41,248,000
17,883,000
1973 ..............
35,050,000
17,813,000
1972 ..............
31,337,000
16,954,000
The other problem we face, as the table suggests, is our recent
inability to achieve meaningful gains in pounds
sold.& The industry has the same
problem.& But for many years we outperformed the
industry in this respect and now we are not.
我们面临的另一个问题，正如表格所示，是我们最近在销售的糖果磅数中没有取得有意义的增长。这个行业也有同样的问题。但是在很多年里我们在这方面比同业做得好，但现在我们没有。
The poundage volume in our retail stores has been virtually
unchanged each year for the past four, despite small increases
every year in the number of shops (and in distribution expense as
well)？？？.& Of course, dollar volume has increased
because we have raised prices significantly.& But
we regard the most important measure of retail trends to be units
sold per store rather than dollar volume.& On a
same-store basis (counting only shops open throughout both years)
with all figures adjusted to a 52-week year, poundage was down .8
of 1% during 1983.& This small decline was our
best same-store performance since 1979; the cumulative decline
since then has been about 8%.& Quantity-order
volume, about 25% of our total, has plateaued in recent years
following very large poundage gains throughout the 1970s.
在我们的零售商店过去四年每一年的磅数的量都没有变化，尽管商店数量每一年有小幅增长（这也同样分摊了费用）。当然，因为我们已经大幅度提高了价格我们的销售额有所增长。但是我们认为零售趋势的最重要衡量指标是单店的销售数量而不是销售额。在同店的基础上（只算两年都开的店），所有数据调整成每年52周，磅数量在1983年下降了0.8%。这个小幅下降是我们从1979年以来最好的同店表现；从那时起累积下降已经差不多8%。订单量，差不多占我们总数的25%，在经过1970年代的非常大幅增长后最近几年已经进入稳定期。
We are not sure to what extent this flat volume - both in the
retail shop area and the quantity order area - is due to our
pricing policies and to what extent it is due to static industry
volume, the recession, and the extraordinary share of market we
already enjoy in our primary marketing area.& Our
price increase for 1984 is much more modest than has been the case
in the past few years, and we hope that next year we can report
better volume figures to you.& But we have no
basis to forecast these.
我们不确定这个稳定的数量到了什么程度---无论是零售商店领域还是订单领域---是由于我们的价格政策，并且在多大程度上是由于静态的行业的量，衰退情况，或者在我们在我们的主要市场已经占有的大份额。我们的价格在1984年增长的比过去几年要温和得多，而且我们希望接下来我们会报告更好的量的数据给你们。但是我们没有依据去预测这些。
Despite the volume problem, See’s strengths are many and
important.&In our primary marketing area, the
West, our candy is preferred by an enormous margin to that of any
competitor.& In fact, we believe most lovers of
chocolate prefer it to candy costing two or three times as much.
(In candy, as in stocks, price
price is what
you give, value is what you get.) The quality of customer service
in our shops & operated throughout the country by us and not by
franchisees is every bit as good as the product.&
Cheerful, helpful personnel are as much a trademark of See’s as is
the logo on the box.& That’s no small achievement
in a business that requires us to hire about 2000 seasonal
workers.& We know of no comparably-sized
organization that betters the quality of customer service delivered
by Chuck Huggins and his associates.
尽管在销量方面有一些难题，喜诗的优势有很多且很重要。在我们主要的市场领域，西部，我们的糖果与竞争者相比更多的利润。事实上，我们相信，大部分巧克力爱好者愿意支付糖果费用的两到三倍。（在糖果领域，就像在股票领域一样，价格和价值可能是不一样的；价格是你付出的，价值是你得到的）。消费者在我们商店得到的服务质量---由我们在整个国家经营而不是由特许经营商经营是和糖果的质量一样好。欢乐和帮助就像喜诗印在盒子上的商标一样。这对一个需要雇佣2000个季节性工人的公司来说是个不小的成就。我们知道没有同等大小的组织可以比库克·哈金斯以及他的伙伴可以提供的服务更好了。
Because we have raised prices so modestly in 1984, we expect See’s
profits this year to be about the same as in 1983.
因为我们在1984年价格提高的很温和，我们期待喜诗的利润和1983年一样。
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